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ABSTRACT
One of the main issues in the OS security is providing trusted code execution in an untrusted
environment. During execution, kernel-mode drivers dynamically allocate memory to store and
process their data: Windows core kernel structures, users' private information, and sensitive data
of third-party drivers. All this data can be tampered with by kernel-mode malware. Attacks on
Windows-based computers can cause not just hiding a malware driver, process privilege escalation,
and stealing private data, but also failures of industrial CNC machines. Windows built-in security
and existing approaches do not provide the integrity and confidentiality of the allocated memory of
third-party drivers. The proposed hypervisor-based system (AllMemPro) protects allocated data
from being modified or stolen. AllMemPro prevents access to even one byte of allocated data, adapts
for newly allocated memory in real time, and protects the driver without its source code. AllMemPro
works well on newest Windows 10 1709 x64.
Keywords: hypervisor-based protection, Windows kernel, Intel, CNC security, rootkits, dynamic
data protection.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Currently, protection of data in computer
memory is becoming essential. Growing
integration of ubiquitous Windows-based
computers into industrial automation makes
this security issue critically important. Windows
machines can be attacked when malware kernelmode code manipulates the memory content of
legal drivers and their dynamically allocated
memory pools, which store critical data.
Intruders can tamper with this data by
installing their own malware driver or using
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vulnerabilities of the installed kernel mode
modules (Adler, 2017).
There are a number of vulnerabilities in
Windows kernel core drivers, as well as in the
third-party drivers such as NVIDIA Windows
GPU Display Driver (NVIDIA Corporation,
2017), Audio Driver (Gee, 2017), keyboard
driver (CSO , 2017), Schneider Electric
UnitelWay Device Driver (Langill, 2011). For
example, an attacker could successfully exploit
the CVE-2017-0155 vulnerability in the Win32k
component and run arbitrary code in kernel
mode (Microsoft , 2017).
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The
vulnerable
VirtualBox
driver
(VBoxDrv.sys) has been exploited by Turla
rootkit and allows to write arbitrary values to
any kernel memory (Singh, 2015; Kirda, 2015).

This malicious code is running at the same
privilege level as a Windows kernel. There are
no built-in Windows security control policies to
prevent illegal malware access in the kernel
mode.

Another vulnerability of CPU-Z driver has
been exploited in HandleMaster project change
granted access rights for handles (MarkHC ,
2017).

As a result , intruders can tamper with the
following allocated data in the kernel-mode, see
Figure 1:

•
•
•

Additionally, m a recent paper 'Windows
exploitation in 2016,' researchers from ESET
underline the vulnerability of third-party
drivers as a real vector of exploitation (Baranov,
2016).

Windows core kernel;
User data;
Industrial automation control software.
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C C machine

I read/write
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Figure 1. Examples of driver's memory access attempts to the allocated memory: legitimate access attempts are in
green, unauthorized ones are dashed red arrows

Windows kernel security issues. Firstly,
hackers patch allocated system data in
Windows kernel to prevent the detection of
installed malware drivers and escalate process
privileges. Information about a loaded driver is
collected in several system lists, which include
allocated structures connected by linked lists.
Hackers can unlink the structure of malware
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drivers from all these lists to make them hidden.
Consequently, bytes in these structures in
memory can be deliberately changed and made
useless in finding malware footprints. These
rootkit techniques are known as 'DKOM. ' Also,
rootkits can read the undocumented kernelmode values. For example, DisPG disables
Windows Kernel P atch Protection by using the
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undocumented value nt!PoolBigPageTableSize,
which needs to be protected (Korkin & Tanda,
2017).

device from the DRIVER OBJECT's linked
list (Rodionov & Matrosov, 2011).

Usually, malware processes are running with
low privilege, and obtaining high privilege can
allow the malware to perform more operations.
Process privileges can be escalated by exploiting
kernel mode driver bugs using SID List
Patching, Privileges Patching, and Token
Stealing payloads (Perla & Oldani, 2010;
Hasherezade, 2017). The issue of finding and
exploiting kernel-mode vulnerabilities is quite
challenging and powerful because it could allow
compromising the system completely (Cisco,
2017).
Another example of escalating process
privileges is the mimikatz framework, which
loads its own driver and manipulates Token
value from EPROCESS structure (Delpy, 2018).
The ProjectSauron is one of the examples of
kernel-mode malware drivers, which are
classified as Advanced Persistent Threat. It
supports commands to elevate privileges to a
system account (Kaspersky, 2016).
One more example is the CVE-2016-7255
exploit, which uses type-confusion vulnerability
in win32k.sys (CVE-2016-7255) to gain elevated
privileges by patching EPROCESS structure
(Oh & Florio, 2017). The similar Elevation-ofPrivilege (EOP) attack was used in Duqu 2.0
exploit (Wook & Florio, 2015).
Another exploit overwrites the Server
Message Block (SMB) connection session
structures to gain Admin/ SYSTEM session
(Rapid7, 2018).
Apart
from
EPROCESS
structures,
attackers are also patching other allocated
Windows objects.
TDL bootkit conceals its presence in the
system by modifying the Startlo field of the
target device's driver and excluding the target
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Win32/ Gapz and ProxyBox hook IRP
handlers
from
DRIVER_ OBJECT.MajorFunction[I array to
protect itself from being removed from the
system. (Rodionov & Matrosov, 2013; Bingham,
2012).
Another technique is to manipulate IRP
structure and IO STACK LOCATION. For
example, by changing CompletionRoutine
pointer, it is possible to avoid the calling of
completion routine of a filter driver, which
prevents collecting evidence of suspicious
activity (Blunden, 2009).
Windows 10 supports Supervisor Mode
Execution Prevention (SMEP), which prevents
the kernel from executing code in user mode, a
common technique used for local kernel
elevation of privilege (EOP). SMEP requires
processor support found in Intel Ivy Bridge or
later processors, and it also can be bypassed
(Shahat, 2018).
The protection system needs to provide
integrity for the sensitive memory objects,
linked lists as well as preventing modification of
each data structure in these lists, which has
been dynamically allocated by Windows kernel.
Additionally, the security software needs to
prevent illegal reading of critical Windows
kernel values.
User data issues. Secondly, malware can
attack the user data located in the kernel
memory. For example, malware could steal or
overwrite private keys, which are used in
cryptographic drivers and can be used to
decrypt user data. Malware can also attack a
user's privacy by reading Windows telemetry
and other data collected by Windows OS.

The protection system needs to prevent
unauthorized
access
to
memory
data
dynamically allocated by third-party drivers.
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Security of industrial automation
control software. Thirdly, malware can cause
considerable damage by attacking industrial
control software. Stuxnet is a famous example
of kernel-mode malware, which took out 1000
centrifuges at Iran's nuclear facility. Its driver
deliberately attacked Windows-based Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) , which is used with
Siemens PLC ( Anderson et al., 2017).

Another report released by Trend Micro
Threat Research and Polytechnic University of
Milan
demonstrates
the
cyber-attack
implementations on actual industrial robots.
(Maggi et al., 2017)

A similar vector for cyber-attacks is the
software for the machines with computer
numerical control (CNC), which use computers
to handle various machine tools: lathes,
grinders, drilling machines etc. CNC machines
are extremely popular in the cutting-edge
manufacturing, for example, they are used by
NASA, Boeing, SpaceX etc. (Isakovic, 2018).
Cybersecurity researchers emphasize a
substantial risk of cyber-attacks against
manufacturing systems and CNC machines
(Vincent et al., 2015; Chhetri et al. , 2016).
Researchers illustrate various threatening
scenarios related to remote maintenance of CNC
machines (Mehnen et al., 2017). Security
experts from the USA stress the serious security
risks for CNC machines and provide nine basic
protection tasks to do before connecting
machine tools to the network. One is to "install
a Windows anti-virus protection service"
(Johnson, 2017). However, there are no specific
AV services to protect industrial CNC
machines, and it is obvious that basic desktop
AVs cannot provide full protection for CN C
machines.
The recent report from a German IT
association says that more than a half of
companies in Germany "have been victims of
industrial espionage, sabotage or data theft in
the last two years" and these "companies had
incurred a loss of around 55 billion euros per
year," which is around 64 billion USD (Burgess,
2017).
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There are several Windows- based CN C
control systems such as Fanuc (Fanuc, 2017),
MACH
series
(Mach,
2018),
UCCNC
(CNCdrive, 2018), MicroSystems (WinCNC,
2018) , which use kernel-mode drivers and
dynamically allocate data in kernel mode to
send the control codes to the machines. For
example, UCCNC software provides an
opportunity to control professional CNC
machines using a tablet PC running on
Windows 8.1. (Stoney CNC, 2015; Bozso777,
2015). Another example is Fanuc software,
which leverages a WinIO library and a parallel
port to manage CNC machines (DSP , 2011).
All this industry control software can be
potentially attacked by a malware driver, which
can accomplish both types of attacks: sabotage
and industrial espionage. The first type of
attacks can result in crashing the machine or
"workpiece damage such as spalling or
delamination" (Schulze et al., 2011). The second
type of attacks can result in sensitive
information being stolen to reconstruct the
workpiece or the technologies of processing, such
as know-how, trade secrets, and confidential
information.
The Deutsche Welle reports that one of the
CN C machines in a German engineering firm
was attacked by spyware: "it turns out their
computer controlled molding cutter came spiked
with sophisticated malware that automatically
transferred sensitive data about the new
prototype to Asian-based Internet Protocol
Addresses" (Knigge, 2013). The CNC machines
security is a sensitive topic and existing hushhush culture makes it very difficult to come up
with concrete examples of the incidents of
cyber-attacks.

@ 2018 ADFSL

Hypervisor-Based Active Data Protection for ...

CDFSL Proceedings 2018

The protection software needs to prevent
illegitimate access to dynamically allocated
buffers m kernel-mode used by industry
software drivers to control CNC machines.

Critical Kernel Data by Wang et al., (2017) the
authors focus on rootkits that place a malicious
code in their installation procedure. HACS
maintains a module whitelist: only the modules
in the whitelist are legal to modify the protected
region. Consequently, HACS does not have an
opportunity to provide various memory access
policies for various kernel modules. Given this
opportunity, HACS could prevent illegal
memory access if one of the trusted drivers is
compromised.

Threat model. Summing up all malware
actions, I would like to introduce a threat
model. The following malware activities will be
considered in this paper, see Figure 1:
•
•
•

•

Intruders avoid all prevention measures
and can install kernel-mode malware;
Malware driver easily finds the memory
content with sensitive data and code;
Malware driver reads and writes the
memory data allocated by Windows
kernel and any third-party drivers;
Malware reads and writes code sections
of kernel modules.

The Windows operating system includes
several features to prevent illegal memory
access. However, these features provide only the
integrity of code sections of kernel modules and
check the integrity of systems linked lists. They
do not provide the integrity of each structure
from these lists and do not prevent reading of
any kernel memory.
There are several research projects, which
partially solve the problem with protection of
allocated data in the kernel.
In the paper Kernel Data Integrity
Protection via Memory Access Control by
Srivastava et al., 2009 the authors proposed
using a hypervisor to mediate the execution of
instructions attempting to write protected
kernel data. Their system prevents overwriting
only Windows OS critical data: process
credentials for privilege escalation and detects
illegal removing structures from linked lists.
This system does not prevent confidentiality
breach of kernel data and code nor does it track
allocation of memory pools to protect them.
In the paper HAGS: A Hypervisor-Based
Access Control Strategy to Protect Security-
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Another system DADE (Yi et al., 2017)
provides kernel integrity via periodically
scanning invariant properties and checking
backtraces of kernel function calls. The
invariants describe the behavior expected from
an uncompromised kernel using the source code
of OS kernel. Authors admit that DADE has
only a probabilistic chance to detect integrity
attacks. Neither does DADE protect the
memory of third-party drivers.
As a result, the issue of providing the
integrity and confidentiality of dynamically
allocated data in the kernel mode is unsolved.
At the same time, the illegal memory access to
this data can result in not only hiding malware
drivers and stealing users' private data, but also
in damaging industrial process and stealing
know-how.
The goal of this paper is to tackle this issue.
First, I propose an active data policy to deal
with kernel-mode malware, which has the
following main principles:

•

•

•

Trap each memory access and grant full
access only to the memory data, which
has been allocated by this driver before;
Prevent unauthorized access even to one
byte of memory allocated by another
driver;
Provide integrity and/ or confidentiality
of the allocated data according to the
principle of least privilege;
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•

Recover memory content after it was
modified.

This active data policy has to be adapted to
changing situations in the OS and help to
restore the original data:

•
•

Separate access memory policies for each
kernel-mode driver;
Automatically update memory access
policies when a new driver is loaded or
any
module
calls
allocation or
deallocation routines.

The purpose of this paper is to present the
design, implementation, and evaluation of a new
hypervisor-based system that protects the
dynamically allocated data in Windows kernel
from being accessed without authorization.
The remainder of the paper proceeds is as
follows:
Section 2 provides the review of newest
kernel mode memory protection features , which
have been integrated into Windows 10 1709.
The comparative analysis of the existing
memory protection approaches will be given
according to the proposed threat model.
Section 3 contains the architecture of
proposed allocated memory protection system AllMemPro and the experimental results .
Section 4 focuses on the main conclusions
and further research directions.

2.

BACKGROUND

This chapter presents the analysis of the
existing papers and software tools that are
focused on allocated memory protection in OS
kernel. Popular research projects are compared
by their capability to provide integrity and
confidentiality to dynamically allocated memory
and code in kernel-mode for OS core kernel and
third-party drivers.
There are several new protection facilities
which have been integrated on Windows 10
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security of the OS: Device Guard, Credential
Guard, UEFI Secure Boot, updated Kernel
Patch Protection (PatchGuard) , Supervisor
Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP), Early
Launch Antimalware (ELAM), Windows
Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) etc. Device
Guard and PatchGuard are dealing with the
issues of memory protection in kernel-mode
memory (Zylva, 2016; Hall et al., 2017).
Device Guard includes three basic
components, one of them being the Kernel Mode
Code Integrity (KMCI) which prevents
patching executable pages m the kernel
memory. According to the "Driver compatibility
with Device Guard in Windows 10" memory
pages and sections can never be writable and
executable simultaneously and executable code
cannot be directly modified (Baxter, 2017).
PatchGuard protects critical structures m
the Windows kernel from modification by
unknown code. It stores and periodically verifies
checksums of specific kernel memory areas.
PatchGuard causes a BSOD if a mismatch is
found. "Kernel patching can result m
unpredictable behavior, system instability, and
performance problems like the Blue Screen of
Death" (Field, 2006). For linked lists,
PatchGuard checks only the integrity of the
links between structures and has 4 various types
of BSOD (Marshall, 2017), without preventing
the structure modification. In addition,
PatchGuard reveals
the corruption of
MajorFunction table in DRIVER_ OBJECT,
but whether it protects other fields or not is
undocumented (Mei, 2014; OSR, 2016).
In summary, Windows built-in security
features provide the integrity of the following:

•
•

code sections of kernel-mode modules;
undocumented internal lists with
allocated structures.

Windows security features do not support
the integrity and confidentiality of allocated
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memory of third-party drivers. In addition,
Windows PatchGuard does not prevent illegal
memory modifications; it just causes a BSOD in
case of them. These BSODs are not appropriate
for use in critical infrastructure, like CNCmachines and industry.
Security experts investigate these security
issues and propose various solutions to protect
sensitive data in the kernel mode. All projects
can be divided into two groups that are based
on
kernel-mode
drivers
and
hardware
virtualization. The scope of this paper is the
hypervisor-based solutions because they work in
a more privileged mode than kernel-mode
malware and are resilient to its attacks.
All hypervisor-based approaches can be
divided into two subgroups according to the
technologies which they use to intercept
memory access in the kernel-mode (Korkin &
Tanda, 2017).
The first subgroup controls memory access
to the sensitive data by marking a memory page
with this data as non-present. Next, each access
to this page generates a page-fault exception
(# PF), which will be trapped and dispatched
by the hypervisor.
The second subgroup leverages a new Intel
VT-x with Extended Page Tables (EPT)
technology. EPT mechanism can separately
intercept read-, write-, and execute access. The
hypervisor allows or disallows access to the
memory page by setting bits in the EPT
memory structures. Thus, any disallowed access
will involve EPT violation and will be processed
by the hypervisor.
EPT mechanism is faster than # PF-based
one. EFT-based approach can intercept, for
example, only write- access and skip others,
while # PF-based one always intercepts all
access to the memory page. At the same time,
# PF-based approaches are working on all
computers, while EPT has been integrated into
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the
Intel
CPUs
microarchi tecture.

since

Nehalem

Srivastava et al. , (2009) confirm that
"kernel-level malicious software has full access
to the data and operations of all kernel
components." Their protection system is based
on page-fault exceptions and protects kernel
variable and system data structure elements
from being patched by malware. Their system
Sentry provides only integrity of dynamically
allocated data by partitioning kernel memory
into two parts: protected and unprotected
regions. The authors assume that the core
kernel has full trust , while other drivers hold
only limited trust. Sentry mediates the
execution of instructions attempting to write
protected kernel data and verifies memory
access at the granularity of high-level language
variables in the kernel's source code. Sentry has
been developed using Linux and Xen hypervisor.
Thus, Sentry does not provide the following:

•

•
•

flexible memory access policy to
protected new allocated data by thirdparty drivers;
confidentiality of data;
kernel-mode code integrity.

Additionally, Sentry requires the kernel's
source code, which is not applicable for
Windows OS.
Another system, HACS (Hypervisor-Based
Access Control Strategy) by Wang et al.,
(2017) , leverages EPT technology to intercept
write requests to the protected regions. HACS
can detect modifications of security-critical
kernel data and escalation process privileges by
setting read-only access rights to the
corresponding memory pages. Authors proposed
to use a whitelist-based access control strategy.
The whitelist, which is made by user experience,
contains only credible kernel modules. One of
HACS 's
features
is
detecting
memory
modifications from a malware code located in
the initialization procedures. This system is
Page 13
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implemented on BitVisor version 1.4 and tested
on Ubuntu version 14. This project includes the
same disadvantages as the previous one and
HACS provides just two levels of trust:
legitimate or illegitimate modules. As a result,
this system cannot prevent access from a
legitimate module to the memory area, allocated
by another legitimate one.

kernel. These security policies are generated
automatically from source codes. LKMG utilizes
the general security policy for dynamic data
access: a driver can only access its own allocated
kernel mode regions. LKMG is based on the Xen
hypervisor and protects only Linux OS.

The project DADE (Data Anomaly
Detection Engine) by Yi et al. , (2017) performs
memory introspection and verifies the integrity
of kernel data by checking whether certain
integrity specifications hold or not. Authors
propose to use EPT facilities to intercept write
access . DADE marks memory pages with
protected data as read-only, and then any write
access to this page generates a page fault, which
is handled by the hypervisor. The key idea of
DADE design is to leverage the information
available at object allocation events, namely
backtraces of kernel function calls. For example,
a malware module attempts to remove their
structure from a system list and produces a
specific deallocation event backtrace. DADE
compares this backtrace with a legitimate one,
which is produced by core kernel when a module
is unloaded. It is obvious that these backtraces
are different and DADE reveals the unlinking
attack. The DADE prototype has been
implemented using KVM hypervisor with Linux
version 3.8.0. DADE requires a source code of
OS kernel.
The issues of preventing commodity OS
kernel from vulnerable loadable kernel modules
are analyzed in the project LKMG (Loadable
Kernel Module Guard) by Tian et al. (2018),
which is related to the second subgroup and uses
EPT technology. LKMG can reveal the
following malware activities in the kernel:
modification of code and data, calling
unauthorized kernel functions and stealing
kernel sensitive information. The authors
propose to use a policy-centric system to isolate
various loadable drivers from the rest of the
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In comparison with Sentry, HACS, and
DADE, LKMG provides integrity and
confidentiality for allocated data as well as code
integrity. However, all of these require a source
code of OS kernel, which is impossible for
Windows OS.
Hypervisor-based system HUKO (Liu et al.,
2011) protects the kernel integrity for
commodity OS from untrusted extensions. It
uses VT-x and EPT technologies and is able to
track dynamic contents such as dynamic kernel
data, stack and heap region, and loadable
extensions. It is able to protect the integrity of
both kernel code and data. HUKO prevents the
OS data from being modified by kernel-mode
drivers by isolating untrusted extensions from
the OS kernel. HUKO considers three different
categories of memory access subjects: OS kernel,
trusted extensions, and untrusted extensions.
HUKO does not restrict the OS kernel. Authors
admit "it is possible that attackers can exploit
the legitimate kernel interface to subvert the
integrity of kernel," for example, by exploiting
bugs of the kernel API functions. In addition,
HUKO does not protect privacy and integrity of
the kernel-mode data of third-party drivers from
being tampered.
There are several research projects InkTag
by Hofmann et al. (2013), AppGuard by Zha et
al. (2015), which apply EPT technology to
guarantee data security. However, they protect
user-mode application contexts with code and
data from the OS kernel and other apps and do
not guarantee the security of kernel-mode
memory.
The following research prototypes ExOShim
by Brookes et al. (2016), HyperForce by
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Gadaleta et al. (2012), and Sprobes by Ge et al.
(2014) prevent memory disclosure attacks and
provide kernel-mode code integrity, without
data protection. These projects only partially
solve the goals of this paper.

at early boot stage and "protects the system by
comparing hashes which are calculated from the
most
important
kernel
region/
sections/ structures with the internal database
hashes." A current version of LKMG provides
code integrity and exploit detection. But, it does
not protect allocated memory of third-party
drivers (Zabrocki, 2018).

Authors proposed to apply the hypervisorbased system to reveal new DKOM attacks,
which tamper with dynamic data structures.
They considered the scenarios when malware
subverts the OS scheduler and proposed an idea
of detecting these anomalies by monitoring and
checking the execution time of all processes.
Their solution can only detect any unauthorized
data modifications, without preventing or
repairing them (Graziano et.al. , 2016).
Security researcher A. Zabrocki proposed an
advanced analog of Patch Guard for Linux-based
OSes. Named Linux Kernel Runtime Guard
(LKRG) , it is a loadable kernel module that
performs runtime integrity checking of the
Linux kernel. LKRG supports from being loaded
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The summary table with the comparative
analysis of the major papers and projects is
given in
T able 1.

In addition, the vast majority of analyzed
methods require the driver's source code to
protect
allocated
data.
The
proposed
AllMemPro system can protect the compiled
code without its source code.
The next section will present the proposed
system, which is said to be free from all the
drawbacks mentioned above .
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Table 1
Summary table of memory protection projects

OS Kernel
Title, year

Device Guard and Patch
Guard in Windows 10 1709,
2017
Sentry, 2009
HUKO, 2011
HyperForce, 2012; Sprobes,
2014; ExOShim, 2016
HACS, 2017
DADE, 2017
LKMG, 2018
LKRG, 2018
AllMemPro, 2018

Third-Party Kernel-Mode Drivers

Integrity
Allocated
Data

Integrity

Code

Allocated
Data

+–A

+

+

Confidentiality

OS

Code

Allocated
Data

Code

–

+

–

–

Windows

–

+

–

–

–

+

+

+–B

–

–

–

Linux
Windows
Linux

–

+

–

–

–

–

Linux

+
+
+
+
+

–
–
+
+
–C

–
+
+–B
–
+

–
–
+
+
–C

–
–
+–B
–
+

–
–
–
–
–C

Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Windows

PROPOSED
3.
ALLOCATED JVlEMORY
PROTECTION ALLJVlEMPRO
This section covers the details of the proposed
hypervisor-based system to guarantee the
confidentiality and integrity of dynamically
allocated data.

Afterward, I will present the architecture of
AllMemPro, which realizes the proposed ideas
and will give some details about how to prevent
unauthorized access to the allocated memory
and grant access to the legitimate kernel-mode
module.
Finally, I will show three cases of using the
developed proof of concept prototype to protect
allocated memory for both third-party driver
and Windows kernel.

To start with, I will show how to apply a
hypervisor and EPT technologies to prevent
three main scenarios of attacks in kernel-mode
memory using active data protection.
A

Windows security features reveal only unlinking critical structures; but they do not prevent changing the
content of these structures;
B
HUKO and LKMG systems do not restrict the OS kernel, and as a result, they only partially protect data,
which have been allocated by third party drivers;
C
The current version of AllMemPro protects only allocated data in the kernel mode. The protection of code
integrity and confidentiality will be implemented further.
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3.1 Apply EPT to Guarantee
futegrity and Confidentiality of
Dynamically Allocated Data.
This section suggests using EPT technology to
prevent typical malware attacks.
As was stated above, the dynamically
allocated
data
can
contain
sensitive
information, such as crypto keys, users' private
data, parameters of CNC machines, process
privileges and drivers' information.
Three Scenarios of Attacks. Attackers
try to tamper all this data and it is possible to
define three main scenarios, see Figure 1. First,
attackers can steal/ read and modify / write the
allocated data of third-party drivers. Second,
they are also able to steal/ read and patch/ write
the code sections of third-party drivers and
Windows core drivers. Finally, they could
unlink and modify the allocated structures in
Windows internal lists.

To prevent all these three scenarios, I
propose to use an active data policy, which has
a separate rule to protect dynamically allocated
data from being stolen or modified illegally. This
policy can also be applied to guarantee the
integrity and confidentiality of kernel-mode
modules, which are loaded in the memory. The
key feature of the active data policy is that it
avoids illegal access to the protected memory
without deliberately generating BSOD like
Windows built-in security systems (Field, 2006).
It also allows protecting newly allocated
memory regions.
To grant only legal access and prevent all
others it is needed to intercept each memory
access to the sensitive memory regions. The
EPT technology provides an excellent
opportunity to trap and process each read-,
write-, and execute- access on the 4-kilobyte
memory page.
Scenario 1. Stealing and modifying the
allocated data of third-party drivers. Let
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us consider the first case when malware tries to
access the allocated memory for the third-party
driver.
To protect the dynamically allocated data I
propose to use the active data policy, which
includes the rules, according to which the
hypervisor will grant or prevent particular
access. The hypervisor controls only the
memory regions, whose data is in the list of
rules.
This rule includes the following five values:
DriverStartAddr,
DriverSize,
AllocatedStartAddr,
AllocatedSize,
and
SharedAccess. As a result , access attempt to the
memory,
which
is
located
between
AllocatedStartAddr and AllocatedStartAddr +
AllocatedSize is granted only to the code from
DriverStartAddr
to
DriverStartAddr
+
DriverSize. An example of such a rule is given
in Table 2.
The default shared access policy prevents
read access (R= 0) and write access (W= 0) to
the memory from other drivers and Windows
kernel.

If this allocated memory needs to be
accessed by another kernel-mode module or
Windows kernel I have to add a similar rule. To
automatically add a corresponding rule, I use a
pre-configured list of driver names, which share
the memory with the protected driver, e.g. for
sharing allocated memory with Windows Kernel
I use ntosknl.exe. Provided I have only a binary
code of the driver module, whose allocated
memory is critical for stealing and modifying I
can apply reverse-engineering analysis to get
such a list of driver names.
The list of rules needs to be updated for each
kernel-mode module, whose memory is
protected. To achieve this, I trap the following
events:

•

the protected driver is loaded and
unloaded;
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the protected module allocates and frees
memory.

To realize the aforementioned active data
policy, I leverage the hypervisor facilities and
EPT technology using five steps.
Step 1. Start: trap loading drivers.
First, the hypervisor is loaded before the
protected driver is loaded to the memory. The

hypervisor will be notified whenever an image is
loaded
into
the
memory
using
PsSetLoadlmageNotifyRoutine and choose,
which kernel-mode driver will be protected
using its name. Apart from module names, the
hypervisor can also use the IMAGE_INFO
structure content; all these parameters need to
be pre-configured.

Table 2
A n example of an active data polic rules

DriverStartAddr

fffff8016f670000
(mem _ allocator _ driver .sys
)
fffff80170201000
(ntosknl.exe)

DriverSiz

AllocatedSize

e

AllocatedStartAdd
r

SharedAcces
s

0000B000

FFFF A400AF3C3F80

40

R= 0, W = 0

008D2000

FFFF A400AF3C3F80

40

R=0, W=0

Step 2. Trap memory allocation
(deallocation) and update EPT pages
permissions. Second, the hypervisor traps each
memory allocation (deallocation) routines. The
hypervisor will choose only those routines from
all that have been called from the code
belonging to the protected driver. Without the
loss of generality, this paper is essentially
concerned
with
the
use
of
ExAllocatePoolWithTag routine to allocate
memory pool and ExFreePoolWithTag to free
allocated memory. This function is used in all
other memory allocation routines, for example,
by ExAllocatePool*, FsRtlAllocatePool*. Also,
it is considered that MiAllocatePoolPages
routine,
which
is
used
by
ExAllocatePoolWithTag, has not been called
directly by a kernel-mode driver.

The corresponding rules for active data
policy will be added (removed) in real time each
time when the protected driver calls the
allocation (deallocation) routine.

process, and control each access to the memory.
The proposed algorithm of using EPT facilities
is taken from the paper by Korkin & Tanda
(2017).
I create EPT paging structures with default
page access bits to permit all access. Next using
the active data policy rules, I limit the access to
the fixed data in the kernel mode memory.
After adding a new rule, t he hypervisor
updates the EPT paging structures: it clears
read- and write- permissions on the pages with
the protected data and it clears read- and write
permissions on the pages with the protected
module. After t he driver has freed memory, the
hypervisor double fills this memory block with
zeroes and removes the corresponding active
data access rule. Removing the rule will cause
restoring the corresponding EPT memory access
permissions.
As a result, each read- and write- access to
the protected memory will cause an EPT
violation.

By applying EPT technology and EPT
paging structures the hypervisor can intercept,
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The hypervisor checks firstly whether an
intercepted access belongs to the protected
memory. Next, it checks which module has
accessed the protected memory, according to
the active data policy rules.

and temporarily grants access to the replaced
memory by setting a read- or write- permission.
The hypervisor also sets an MTF.

Step 3. Grant a legitimate access. The
hypervisor grants access to the memory region
only for the protected module, which has
allocated this memory before, see Table 2. To
achieve it the hypervisor temporarily sets reador write- permission of the protected page and
sets a Monitor Trap Flag (MTF) . Setting MTF
enables the system to generate VM Exit after
executing each instruction.

After the legitimate code accesses the
memory, the control goes to the hypervisor
again because of VM Exit. At this step, the
hypervisor restores page permission by clearing
access bits and clears MTF.
Step 4. Prevent an unauthorized
access. If a module not mentioned in the active
data policy tries to access the protected
memory, the hypervisor needs to prevent it. To
achieve it, the hypervisor changes the page
frame number (PFN) to the corresponding Page
Table Entry (PTE) for the protected memory

@ 2018 ADFSL

After an unauthorized module reads or
writes to the replaced page and executes just
one instruction, the control goes to the
hypervisor, because of VM Exit. Next , the
hypervisor restores initial configuration: by
setting an original PFN value for the protected
memory, clearing access bits, and clearing MTF.
Step 5. Finish: trap unloading the
protected driver. After the protected driver
has been unloaded the hypervisor zeroes out the
memory, where this driver had been loaded.

To be notified whenever an image is
unloaded the hypervisor overwrites the function
address of the DriverUnload from the
DRIVER OBJECT (MSDN, n.d.-a; OSR,
2017).
These five steps provide the integrity and
confidentiality for the dynamically allocated
data in Windows kernel, see Figure 2.
The proposed approach can be used for
three malware scenarios, mentioned above.
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VMX non-root VMX-root
mode
mode
Inititl EPr paging strucrures

{Kernel-nm.el

EPr paging strucrures on~ 3
Alloc:atedMemory.read = TRUE
ADocaedl\,lem.ory.write = TRUE
ADocatedMernory.PFN= ORIGINAL

AilP8fJ!,&read = true
AJIPages.write = true
AJIPages.- = true

AII.OiherMemory.read = true
AIOtherMemo:i:y.write = true

~sl&2

read/
write
Acc:ess

AII.Otherl\,lemory,e:\2C = true

r------------------~

ADocatedMemory.read = FALSE 1
1 Alloc:atedMemory.wrne = FALSE : _
1ADoc atedMemory.PFN= ORIGINAL 1

MTF=TRUE

I

EPr paging muctures o n ~ 4
Alloc:atedMemory.read = TRUE
ADocaedl\,lernory.write = TRUE
ADoc atedMemory.PFN=F AKE

AII.OiherMemory.read = true
AilOtherMemo:i:y.write = tru.e
AII.Otherl\,lemory,e:\2C = true

MfF=FALSE
LiriofActwe
Memory Polii:e
R-ules

AII.OiherMemory.read = true
AilOtherl\,lemo:i:y.write = tru.e
AII.Otherl\,lernory.e:\2C = true
MTF=TRUE

Figure 2. The proposed method of preventing allocated memory from being illegally read or overwritten

Scenario 2. Stealing and patching code
sections. One of the new protection
mechanisms, which has been integrated into
Windows Device Guard in Windows 10, is the
Kernel
Mode
Code
Integrity
(KMCI)
component.
This
component
prevents
modification of executable code directly and
does not stop code reading. As a result, the code
confidentiality is still becoming vulnerable.

The preliminary testing of AllMemPro
shows that the proposed approach of
dynamically data protection cannot be used for
code protection because it causes a serious
overhead. One of the possible ideas for code
protection is to apply two EPT structures: first
EPT structure allows execution of the protected
driver and blocks execution from all other
memory; second EPT structure blocks access to
the protected data and allows execution from all
memory apart from the protected driver.
The code protection will be implemented in
further versions of AllMemPro.
Scenario 3.
Tampering
Windows
Data. To prevent unlinking and modifying the
allocated structures in Windows internal lists, I
add a rule for each structure (Sherer, 2017).
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For example, to avoid hiding EPROCESS
structure by DKOM patching: structure
unlinking and replacing its content (Korkin &
Nesterow, 2016) , the hypervisor adds rules for
the existing structures. The hypervisor updates
the list of rules and traps newly allocated
structures
using
PsSetCreateProcessN otify Routine
routine
(MSDN , n.d.-c). The AllocatedDataAddress
and AllocatedDataSize are the address and the
size of an EPROCESS structure; the
ModuleStartAddress
and
ModuleSize
correspond to the ntosknl.exe.
This section has covered a way of
maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of
dynamically allocated data by using active data
policy and leveraging the hardware-based
hypervisor and EPT technology.
The next section covers the architecture of
the developed prototype, which realizes active
data policy.

3. 2

Architecture of AllMemPro

This section covers the design and architecture
of the developed hardware-based hypervisor
AllMemPro, which realized the active data
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policy to protect the dynamically allocated
memory in Windows kernel.

memory access permissions to the pages, which
include the protected data by clearing read- and
write- bits. As a result , each memory access
attempt to the protected data will cause EPT
violation.

The proposed system includes three main
components: the Controller, Trigger, and
Policy.
The Controller traps loading drivers and
allocation of data. To trap loading of each
driver,
the
Controller
uses
PsSetLoadimageN otifyRoutine routine, which
registers a driver-supplied callback to notify
whenever a new driver is loaded. A
corresponding callback function gets three basic
values, which are used to separate the protected
drivers from others: full name to the loaded
image file; an ImageBase and an ImageSize of
the loaded driver in the memory (MSDN, n.d.b).
In the current version, the Controller
chooses, which driver has to be protected using
its name, but it is also possible to choose the
protected driver using the calculated CRC from
its file in the memory. The Controller intercepts
memory
allocation
routine
ExAllocatePoolWithTag
and
memory
deallocation routine ExFreePoolWithTag using
DdiMon developed by Tanda (2016). DdiMon
monitors and controls kernel API calls with
stealth hook using EPT technology.
The Controller intercepts that the protected
driver allocates memory and automatically
sends the following rule structure to the Trigger
and to the Policy, see Figure 3.
The Trigger intercepts access to the
protected memory data using the hypervisor
and EPT facilities. The code of the Trigger is
based on the MemoryMonRWX hypervisor
(Kor kin & Tanda, 2017).
In the beginning, the Trigger allocates EPT
paging structure for all kernel-mode memory
pages and sets default access right to skip all
read-, write-, and execute- accesses. After
receiving a rule from the Controller, it changes
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The Trigger processes all EPT violation and
chooses between using two possible scenarios:
grant and prevent access to the data by calling
the Policy.
In the first case, the Trigger allows access to
the protected data and sets Monitor Trap Flag
(MTF), see EPT structure on step 4 on
Figure 2. As a result, after executing just one
instruction the Trigger traps control again and
restores page permission by clearing read- and
write- bits and clears MTF.
In the second case, as you can see EPT
structure on step 4 Figure 2, the Trigger
redirects access to the fake page by changing
PFN value on the EPT page, which corresponds
to the protected data. The Trigger also allows
access to this data and sets MTF. As a result,
after an unknown code accesses the fake data
and executes just one instruction, the control
goes to the Trigger again. Now the Trigger
restores the original EPT configuration, see
steps 1 & 2 in Figure 2.
The Trigger decides which case is processed
according to the Policy module.
The Policy provides logic to grant and
prevent access to the data according to the
active data policy rules.
The Policy grants full privileges to the
owner of allocated memory. If an unregistered
or unknown code accesses the protected data,
the logic of processing will be the following:

•
•

if 'is readable==0' a code cannot read
the data, otherwise it can read them;
if 'is overwritable==0' a code cannot
write to this memory, otherwise it can
write there;
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To allow another driver or Windows Kernel
to read or to write to the protected data, the
similar memory policy rule needs to be added.
In a nutshell, the Policy uses the discrete
access control to prevent illegal access even to
one byte of the protected data.
AllMemPro system is developed using
Microsoft Visual c++ 2015 with integrated
Windows Driver Kit (WDK). It is tested using
Vmware Workstation 14 and Windows 10 1709
Build 16299.15 64-bit and multi-core CPU. The
source code of AllMemPro is here Korkin
(2018).
I can conclude that the proposed hypervisorbased system has the following three
advantages:

•

it can protect newly allocated memory
using the Controller component;
it can prevent read- and write- access
even to 1 byte of the protected data
using the Trigger and the Policy;
it works even without the source code of
the protected driver.

•

•

The next section will cover the three
scenarios to demonstrate the facilities of
AllMemPro.
•

int •
•
•
~
int •
•
•
~
}MEKJRY POLICY , ·APMEKJRY_POLICT; a

;i

•

Figure 3. A structure to store a memory control
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Demos of AllMeniPro

This section covers the demonstrations of
applying AllMemPro hypervisor to protect
kernel-mode memory. I show how AllMemPro
isolates the dynamically allocated memory of
third-party driver by read- and write- access
from another one.
Firstly, I load the kernel-mode driver
(mem_allocator_driver.sys), which allocates
memory fragment and reads this memory in the
loop as well as updates the content of this
memory after receiving the IOCTL-code from
the
console
control
app
(mem _ allocator _ console.exe).
Next, I load the second kernel-mode driver
(mem _attacker_ driver.sys) , which plays the
role of a spyware driver. This driver reads and
writes to the content of memory, which was
allocated by the first driver. Let me assume that
a spyware driver can find the allocated data
from mem allocator driver.sys without any
issues. I control the second driver using another
console program.
Figure 4 shows the main scheme. The
addresses and sizes of loaded drivers and
allocated data are in Table 3.
This unauthorized access demonstrates the
fact that the allocated memory is not isolated
from unauthorized access from others.

typeder •struct · MEKJRY POLICY· { i
•
void*•
•
• ~
;i
•
11msigned · int64 • drvSize; i
•
void*•
•
•
~
;i
•
11msigned · int64 • a l locSize ; i
•

3 .3

;i

The
source
code
of
mem allocator driver.sys
and
mem _ attacker _ driver.sys with control console
apps is here Korkin (2018).
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,------------------------------------------------ ,
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me1m

aUocator consde_,e,:.,e
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1I 6,• - ---~------........1
1

M

]oadl

1 :::,

11m]oodl

---------

I

attac~er cons.oJ,e_,e..x,e

1

----~~-~-----

Send
IOCTL codes

foadl
un]oad

--------------------

Send
IOCTL codes
---

I

I

1

1

__________ I

mem _ attad~er_driv er_ s.y s.
( a.demo s.pyv.r ru:,e driiv,er)

mem_aU~~~r_driv er_s.y s. I
(] egitimat,e)
AUocate
memory _

Other

W'ii ndow s. I
A]focated data.

I

I

Kemd

Th:irvers

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ IC

Figure 4. Illegal driver reads and writes t he memory alloca ted by the ot her driver

Table 3
T he details of objects in m emory for the Fiqure

4

Object in memory

mem _ allocator _ driver .sys
Allocated dat a by
mem _ allocator _ driver .sys
mem - attacker _ driver. sys.sys

Secondly, I load a hypervisor AllMemPro,
see Figure 5 and Table 4 and the following rule
is added automatically, see
T able 5. After that , I restore the allocated
data content using control app for the first
driver and try to read and write this data using
the second driver. I can see that all access
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Start address

FFFFF8016F630000
FFFF A400AC479FD0
FFFFF8016F650000

Size

0xb000
0xlO
0x9000

attempts from the second driver fail: after
reading, I get a zero value and writing access
does not change the content. The corresponding
debug output fragments of AllMemPro are in
Figure 6.
I can conclude that AllMemPro provides
integrity and confidentiality for the dynamically
allocated memory.
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load/
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1 .... ,.-...,
I o Q)
I

O'"d

1-;

6

o

I
S
I -Ill
,.... '
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load/
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-------------------
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.
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:

I
I
1
1
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mem _:attacker~driver..sys
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mem,ory
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I
I
I
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Allocated data

Windows
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-------------------1
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I
1
I

------~ - - ~
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Figure 5. AllMemPro grants access to the allocated memory only to the first
kernel-mode driver according to the rule

Table 4
T he details of objects in memory for th e Fiqure 5

Object in memory

Start address

mem _ allocator _ driver .sys
Allocated data by mem _ allocator_ driver .sys
mem _ attacker_ driver .sys
nt (ntkrnlmp. exe)

FFFFFS0 16F630000
FFFF A400AC4 79FD0
FFFFFS0 16F650000
FFFFF80170201000

Size

0xb000
0xlO
0x9000
0x8D2000

Table 5
The rule allows the mem allocator driver. sys access to the allocated data

rule FFFFF8016F630000 B000 FFFFA400AC479FD0 10
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Debug Output Fragment for legal read- access:
22:34:47.513
INF
#0
4
7732 System
8= FFFFF8016F6317C8 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479FD8 (0000000000000000), T = R
Debug Output Fragment for legal write- access:
22:34:50.357
INF
#0
8020
8144 mem _ allocator
8= FFFFF8016F6314EA (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFF A400AC479FD8 (0000000000000000), T = W,
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 => 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ba 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00
Debug Output Fragment for illegal read-access:
illegal access FFFFF8016F651228 =>> FFFFA400AC479FD8
** RweHandleMonitorTrapFlag FFFFF8016F651228 FFFF A400AC479FD8

**

22:35:05.952
INF
#0
76
8060 mem allocator
[Protected via ActiveMemPolice] Memory is being READ. Returning fake contents.
22:35:05.952
INF
#0
76
8060 mem _ allocator
8= FFFFF8016F651228 (FFFFF8016F650000) , D= FFFF A400AC479FD8 (0000000000000000), T= R
Debug Output Fragment: for illegal write-access:
illegal access FFFFF8016F651257 = > > FFFF A400AC479FD8
** RweHandleMonitorTrapFlag FFFFF8016F651257 FFFF A400AC479FD8

**

22:35:20.405
INF
#0
76
8060 mem _ allocator
8= FFFFF8016F651257 (FFFFF8016F650000), D= FFFFA400AC479FD8 (0000000000000000), T= W,
0000000000000000~~000000000000 => 0000000000000000~~000000000000
22:35:20.405
INF
#0
76
8060 mem allocator
[Protected via ActiveMemPolice] Memory is being WRITTEN. Returning fake contents.
Figure 6. The fragments of debug output for the Figure 5

Finally, I consider a general case, with
shared memory. Now the first driver uses the
allocated data to retrieve the system
information using Windows Kernel routines, see
Figure 7 and Table 6. To share the allocated
data between the first driver and Windows
Kernel, I use the following two rules, see
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Table 7. The first line makes the allocated
buffer available to the first driver, and the
second line - for the Windows kernel,
routine
has
(ntoskrnl.exe).
Windows
successfully written internal data to this
memory. The AllMemPro isolates this data
from the second driver. All illegal memory
attempts fail, see Figure 8.
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1------------------------------------------------:]
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Figure 7. AllMemPro grants access to the allocated memory to the first kernel-mode driver and
Windows Kernel. AllMemPro prevents access to the second, which is not in the list rules

Table 6
T he details of objects in memory for the Fiqure 7
Object in memory

mem allocator _ driver.sys
Shared Allocated data
mem attacker driver.sys
nt (ntkrnlmp.exe)

Start address

FFFFF8016F630000
FFFF A400AC4 79F80
FFFFF8016F650000
FFFFF80170201000

Size

0xb000
0x40
0x9000
0x8D2000

Table 7
The rules allow mem allocator driver. sys and ntkmlmp. exe to access to the allocated memory

/ / for mem _allocator_ driver.sys
rule FFFFF8016F630000 B000 FFFFA400AC479F80 40
/ / for ntkrnlmp.exe
rule FFFFF80170201000 8D2000 FFFF A400AC4 79F80 40
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Debug Output Fragment for illegal write- access

**

RweHandleMonitorTrapFlag FFFFF8016F651228 FFFFA400AC479F80

**

22:58:18.560
INF
#0
76
8060 mem _ allocator _
[Protected via ActiveMemPolice] Memory is being READ. Returning fake contents.
22:58:18.560
INF
#0
76
8060 mem _ allocator _
8= FFFFF8016F651228 (FFFFF8016F650000), D= FFFFA400AC479F80 (0000000000000000), T = R
Debug Output Fragment for legal write-access (mem allocator driver.sys, memset
function fragment):

22:51:03.306
INF
#0
4
7732 System
8= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8B (0000000000000000), T=

w,
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7d ff Of 00 = > 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7d ff Of 00
22:51:03.306
INF
#0
4
7732 System
8= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8C (0000000000000000), T =

w,
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7d ff Of 00 = > 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff Of 00
22:51:03.306
INF
#0
4
7732 System
8= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8D (0000000000000000) , T =

w,
00000000000000000000000000fffil00 => 0000000000000000000000000000fil00
22:51:03.306
INF
#0
4
7732 System
8= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8E (0000000000000000) , T =

w,
0000000000000000000000000000fil00= > 00000000000000000000000000000000
22:51:03.306
INF
#0
4
7732 System
8= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8F (0000000000000000), T =

w,

00000000000000000000000000000000= > 00000000000000000000000000000000
Debug Output Fragment for legal write-access (ntkrnlmp.exe,
ZwQuerySystemlnformation):

22:51:03.306
INF
#0
4
7732 System
8= FFFFF801702FB65B (FFFFF80170201000), D= FFFF A400AC479F84 (0000000000000000), T =

w,

00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 = > 00 00 00 00 5a 62 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
22:51:03.306
INF
#0
4
7732 System
8= FFFFF801702FB65F (FFFFF80170201000), D= FFFF A400AC479F88 (0000000000000000), T =

w,

In a similar way, I have successfully checked
AllMemPro possibility of preventing illegal
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privileges escalation by directly modifying the
content of EPROCESS structure.
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As a result, AllMemPro prevents stealing
and modifying data, stores in the allocated
memory pools in the kernel-mode and moderate
performance overhead.

the legal driver, when AllMemPro had been
activated.

4.

ALLJVlEJVIPRO:
POINTS FOR
DEVELOPJVlENT

This chapter focuses on critical analysis of
AllMemPro downsides and possible ways of its
improvement.

Overhead .
AllMemPro
AllMemPro
causes overhead during accesses to the protected
memory regions, and this occurs because of
several reasons, which can be partially
eliminated.
The evaluation of overhead was performed
by measuring the duration of 10 access attempts
to the allocated memory in three cases: without
hypervisor with enabled memory cache; without
hypervisor and disabled cache; and finally, with
AllMemPro hypervisor and time cheating.
All these measures are processed on
VMware Workstation Pro in the release version
of all drivers. To get enough measurements, I
use 200 repetitions, next I delete five maximum
values and five minimum ones, and finally
calculate the average and deviation values; see
Table 8.
In the first case, the latency is quite small
because after first several memory access
attempts, the corresponding virtual and
physical addresses are cached, and further
accesses were processed using these cache
values. To make the comparison with hypervisor
case a bit more appropriate, I applied the second
case with the deliberately disabled cache.

AllMemPro hypervisor traps each access to
the protected memory region because this
memory does not have read- and writepermissions. After that, the hypervisor sets the
corresponding permissions and according to the
Memory Access Policy allows or disallows
memory access to this data by changing
PFN-value. At this step, AllMemPro sets MTF
and returns control to the guest. After the guest
executes just one instruction, the control goes to
the hypervisor again because of MTF.
Next AllMemPro clears MTF and restores
original permissions to the memory to be able
to trap a new access to the protected region.
As a result, for each memory access attempt ,
AllMemPro has been called two times, which
leads to time degradation.
It is possible to partially eliminate this time
degradation by applying two EPT structures.
The first EPT structure corresponds to the legal
driver and its memory and the second EPT - to
the other memory ranges . However, in this case,
to isolate the allocated memory of two and more
drivers from each other and from the other
drivers it is needed to allocate the separate EPT
structures for each driver. This approach has
been implemented in the MemoryMonRWX
hypervisor by Korkin and Tanda (2017).
As a result, AllMemPro protects memory,
which has a low frequency of access, for
example,
the
EPROCESS.Token
value.
AllMemPro does not decrease memory access
time for non-protected memory regions. To
protect memory, which is very often accessible,
it is possible to apply multiple EPT structures.

In the third case, I measured the latency of
memory access to the protected memory from
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Table 8
Time evaluation

No

1
2
3

Cases

without AllMemPro with enabled cache
without AllMemPro with disabled cache
with AllMemPro hypervisor

Indirect Memory Access. AllMemPro
determines the source address by reading the
value of RIP register from VMCS-structure. To
prevent indirect memory access, AllMemPro
can additionally check the call stack, but in the
current version, this is not implemented.
Self-protection:
Resilience
to
Manipulations. Malware driver can access the
protected data by deliberately changing the
rules content. It is possible to protect these
policies by applying the proposed AllMemPro
hypervisor to protect itself.
Protect Memory with Shared Access.
The current AllMemPro protects shared
memory in the following way. For two drivers,
using shared memory, all memory regions,
which are allocated to each of these drivers, are
available to read- and write- access by either
driver and are isolated from any other accesses.
It is possible to provide fine-grained access
control to shared memory.

To allow shared access only to the
programmer-specified buffers, it is necessary to
integrate AllMemPro at a source level during
driver development.
Pagefile Mechanism. It is possible to
overwrite the third-party driver allocated
memory by forcing the kernel to page-out the
kernel memory pool and then locating and
overwriting the driver memory inside the
pagefile in the hard disk. This can be used not
only to attack the memory pool but also to
overwrite the third-party driver code sections.
The current version of AllMemPro does not
protect the pagefile mechanism.

@ 2018 ADFSL

Memory Access Latency, TSC
ticks

70±2
100.000±4.000
500.000±10.000

Firmware exploitation as a vector of
infection. This research does not consider
firmware exploitation as one of the possible
ways of infections. Because of this infection, the
malware code is able to tamper both OS and
hypervisor memory, as well as injecting code
into OS kernel. Hypervisor-based solutions
cannot prevent such infections.
Direct
Access
to
the
Physical
Memory. AllMemPro can potentially prevent
direct access to the physical memory or access
to
the
mapped
memory
pages
by
MmMapLockedPages(). The current version of
AllMemPro deliberately converts the virtual
address to the physical one. At the same time,
DMA attacks using firmware exploitation and
hardware are out of the scope of this paper.
Confidentiality and Integrity of Code
Sections. The current version of AllMemPro
protects only allocated data in the kernel mode.
The protection of code sections from being
illegally read and overwritten will be
implemented further.
Joint work with Windows 10: Device
Guard and Credential Guard. AllMemPro
has been successfully tested on default
installation Windows 10 x64 1709 version,
which is installed as a BIOS-version. The tested
on UEFI versions of Windows OS will be
processed further.
SGX technology and Virtual Secure
Mode. The Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
technology makes it possible to protect the areas
of execution in memory via enclaves. This
technology has been integrated into 6 th
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generation Intel CPUs, while AllMemPro
supports
Intel
CPUs
since
Nehalem
microarchitecture, which is more common now.
In addition, a similar idea was implemented
to secure kernel for Windows 10 by leveraging
Virtual Secure Mode with Virtual Trust Levels
(VTLs). According to A. Ionescu, it is possible
to apply VTL to protect some kernel-mode data
(Juarez, 2015; Ionescu, 2015; Laiho, 2016).

5.

CONCLUSIONS &
FUTUREWORK

To sum up, the proposed security system
AllMemPro has the following competitive
advantages:

•

•

•

•

it provides fine-grained control to
mediate access from kernel-mode drivers
to the dynamically allocated memory;
it protects allocated memory of thirdparty drivers and the content of OS
structures;
it guarantees the integrity and
confidentiality of the allocated data by
redirecting unauthorized access without
crushing OS;
it is an open-source project with minimal
lines of code, which can be used for
educational purposes to teach VT-x &
EPT.

Spectre
Meltdown
Attacks.
&
AllMemPro hypervisor seems to be able to
prevent sensitive kernel-mode data from being
stolen using the newest Spectre and Meltdown
attacks (Horn, 2018); however, further research
is required.

With regard to t he future, I would like to
suggest the following ideas of using AllMemPro
to prevent:

•
•

leakage of the Windows Telemetry
memory data;
drivers' exploitation by validating
kernel-mode code execution;
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•

unauthorized access from kernel-mode
malware to files, registry, and processes.

Windows Telemetry leakage. Windows
Telemetry includes a lot of sensitive user
information and has to be protected from
unauthorized access by malware. Another issue
is to disable the Windows Telemetry data
reliably. As a result, users will be confident that
the private data: Browsing History, Voice Input ,
GPS data, etc. will not be collected and
transferred to anyone.
Preventing Drivers' Exploitation. To
reveal the fact that t he driver is being exploited
I propose t he following. AllMemPro will trap
and log the driver code execution using a lot of
valid input data. Secondly, I will analyze the
progress of code execution and create some
signatures, using the corresponding control flow
graph (CFG). Finally, I will test this code using
common data or data with exploits. By
comparing the code execution with signature
CFG , I will check whether the code executes all
its parts, or it skips something from CFG. If it
skips any part, it means that the driver's
behavior is not normal, and someone is using its
vulnerability.
Preventing Kernel-Mode Malware to
Access Files and Registry. Windows
security model provides the registry key and file
security only for user-mode applications. It
means that kernel-mode drivers do not have any
limitations to access filesystem and registry. As
a result , malware driver can read, write, and
even delete files and registry data, which are
processed by user-mode applications or other
drivers. My idea is to adapt the AllMemPro to
prevent this unauthorized access by monitoring
and controlling access attempts to filesystem
and registry. The proposed system will use the
similar active policies to grant access only to the
owner and registered drivers and will stop access
from the illegal ones.
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